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I
INTRODUCTION
In legal scholarship, it is almost self-evident that “certainty” is an advantage
for regulation.1 “Uncertainty,” on the other hand, is usually viewed as an
inevitable by-product of vague legal standards that may be justified by the
prohibitive cost of creating bright-line rules or by the inability of the legislature
to account ex ante for the complexity of a particular situation.2 This article
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1. See Joseph Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823, 841–42 (1972)
(“Since the law should strive to balance certainty and reliability against flexibility, it is, on the whole,
wise legal policy to use rules as much as possible for regulating human behavior as they are more
certain than principles and lend themselves more easily to uniform and predictable application.”); see
also Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee, Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 279, 298–99 (1986) (analyzing two undesirable social effects that stem from uncertain regulation:
(1) over-deterrence and (2) inefficient risk-taking); Kenneth W. Gideon, Assessing the Income Tax:
Transparency, Simplicity, Fairness, 25 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 101, 104–06 (1999) (arguing against the use of
broad standards in tax law because of the harm of uncertainty); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178–83 (1989) (arguing that courts should decide cases in such
a way that provides guidance to lower courts, future legislators, and citizens); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV 22,
62–64 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 957 (1995) (describing the
conventional view that clarity of rules is a target of law). For a review of some of the main drawbacks of
uncertainty in antitrust law, see Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 99 (2007).
2. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 562–63
(1992) (observing that while rules are less costly than standards to interpret and apply, they are more
costly to create). In the context of contract law, similar claims regarding the cost of contractual
vagueness have been put forth. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract
Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1587–88 (2005); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis,
Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006); Steven Shavell, On the Writing
and Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 289 (2006). But see Albert Choi & George
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challenges the conventional view and proclaims the advantages of legal
uncertainty.3
This article combines jurisprudential argument with behavioral analysis and
experimental demonstration. The jurisprudential argument exposes the
distorting effect of the law, which leads people to neglect their genuine
preferences and moral perceptions and behave in a manipulative–strategic way.
It further identifies contexts and circumstances in which creating a “veil of
ignorance,” which partially masks people’s awareness and knowledge of the ex
post legal consequences of their acts, may be desirable.
The jurisprudential discussion begins with the merits of creating a partial
veil of ignorance for the ex post consequences of the law. Such a veil may
promote values such as autonomy, efficiency, distributive justice, and personal
well-being. Furthermore, such a veil of ignorance may encourage people to act
in a natural and non-strategic way, namely, in a way that is not driven by legal
incentives. Nonetheless, we also recognize the obvious problems associated with
creating a veil that masks the ex post implications of the law. Indeed, ignorance
of the law seems to be at odds with the main purpose of legal regimes, such as
torts and criminal law, which aim to guide people’s behavior.4 Furthermore, the
argument seems to run into a logical paradox: If following the law may create
more harm than good, should not such a law be abandoned altogether? And if
the law is just and efficient, why should it be hidden? Recognizing these
challenges, we developed an innovative taxonomy comprised of three types of
legal areas where masking the legal consequences of an act ex ante will benefit
both individuals and society at large.
The first type occurs when people who find themselves in a certain situation
ex post are offered a solution, but policy makers wish to prevent a case where
they choose to be in that situation ex ante.
Such tension between one’s ex post legal status and ex ante knowledge of
the law was recognized by Meir Dan-Cohen’s canonical argument on acoustic
separation in criminal law. According to Dan-Cohen, the law speaks with two
Triantis, Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 503, 503–04
(2008) (arguing that ambiguity signals an unwillingness to sue).
3. Contrary to the conventional view, support for uncertainty was developed recently by Alon
Harel & Uzi Segal, Criminal Law and Behavioral Law and Economics: Observations on the Neglected
Role of Uncertainty in Deterring Crime, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 276, 277 (1999). In the context of tax
law, see generally David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215 (2002); Kyle
D. Logue, Optimal Tax Compliance and Penalties When the Law Is Uncertain, 27 VA. TAX REV. 241
(2007). According to those views, in the context of tax law, uncertainty may enhance the deterrence
effect of regulation due to risk aversion. This article, however, highlights the opposing side, arguing that
uncertainty decreases legal influence on behavior in a way that strengthens “authentic behaviors.” See
also Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1 (identifying similar effects in torts law).
4. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169,
207–09 (1968) (discussing the use of law to deter crime). At least in the context of criminal law,
ambiguity may lead to invalidation of the law. Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)
(“[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first
essential of due process of law.”).
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voices. To the individual, the law issues rules that instruct the individual how to
behave. To the authorities (for example, courts and administrative agencies),
the law uses “decision rules” to assist in determining the legal ramifications of
an individual’s actions.5
While Dan-Cohen’s focus is on the institutional aspect of the distinction
between conduct and decision rules within the context of criminal law, this
article’s framework differs in a few ways. First, it focuses on ways in which
“legal ignorance” may be desirable in the law in general, not only with regard to
certain defenses within criminal law. Second, it provides a larger framework to
distinguish between rules that attempt to direct the individual how to behave
and rules that respond to the specific situation of the individual.6
The second type of situation in which the veil may be beneficial is that in
which a certain course of action is desirable only when undertaken with
genuine, nonstrategic motives. For example, in the tax context, policy makers
may allow a certain transaction to take place, but not purely for purposes of tax
avoidance.
The third type focuses on the identity-related value that may emerge when
one is unaware of potential legal benefits for engaging in socially desirable
activities. Although in the second type, policy makers are neutral to one’s
choice of action as long as one’s motivation is genuine, in the third type, there is
a desired course of action. If one’s motivation is not driven by legal benefits, the
value to both self and society from one’s behavior will increase. Classic
examples are organ donation and surrogacy, where society sees such action as
desirable but fears the inadvertent harm of incentives for donors. Such harm
may occur due to psychological processes such as crowding-out motivation or
sociological processes such as commodification.
Following this taxonomy, we rely on behavioral methodologies and theories
to demonstrate how uncertainty may become an effective veil for the ex post
ramifications of the law. We begin with an examination of possible behavioral
theories that support the proposition that when the law is uncertain, people are
likely to diminish their reliance on legal benefits during the decision-making
process.
Using an experimental survey approach, we compare the reported future
behavior of respondents taken from a representative panel of the Israeli
population toward employment practices under different legal regimes. The
experimental manipulation focuses on the certainty of granting benefits
associated with getting a “non-employer” status. Findings suggest that under
conditions of uncertainty (for example, ambiguity and partial uncertainty where
probabilities were provided), participants were less affected by benefits granted
under the law. In contrast, when participants were asked to evaluate the
5. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law,
97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 630–31 (1984).
6. We focus here on explaining the difference between our first type and Dan-Cohen’s argument;
our second and third types are too different to enable a meaningful comparison.
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behavior of others, uncertain benefits did have an effect on their behavior. The
study also demonstrates an interaction, where uncertainty is more influential for
individuals with low and intermediate levels of preference than for those with
strong preferences.
We then recognize some of the drawbacks of uncertainty, even in those
areas where masking the law is desirable. First, there is the fear of excessive
litigation. Second, there are distributive problems that might arise given an
inequality in the effect of uncertainty on different parties. Those concerns are
taken into account in part V of this paper, which discusses policy implications.
To clarify our arguments, we wish to define and provide context to some of
the main concepts that are used in this article. First, the concepts of uncertainty
and ambiguity, which are treated as two different concepts in the Judgment and
Decision Making (JDM) literature,7 are used interchangeably throughout this
paper, as the differences between the two meanings are less relevant for our
purposes than for JDM scholars. Second, throughout this article, we use the
terms “genuineness” and “authenticity” especially with regard to the distinction
between one’s initial preference and one’s attempt to gain instrumental legal
benefits. In the philosophical literature, the association of authenticity with the
notion of staying true to oneself when facing external values is constantly
challenged, as philosophers and psychologists recognize that in the real world,
where social forces play a dominant role, achieving full authenticity is neither
8
possible nor desirable. Indeed, we recognize the contribution of social and legal
institutions to the formation of one’s preference. Nonetheless, clearly, the law
also has direct instrumental calculative legal effects, and our focus on the
potential positive role of masking the law through uncertainty is mainly aimed
at this function.
II
LEGAL IGNORANCE AS BLISS
A. Theoretical Framework
Law is one of society’s most important tools for directing behavior. Every
legal system contains incentives for certain kinds of activities and penalties for
others.9 Law also has important roles in designing social institutions10 and

7. These two concepts are the most heavily studied in the JDM literature. For an example that
attempts to study the relationship between these two concepts in the decision-making process, see
generally Hillel J. Einhorn & Robin M. Hogarth, Ambiguity and Uncertainty in Probabilistic Inference,
92 PSYCHOL. REV. 433 (1985).
8. For a discussion of the complex concept of “authenticity,” see generally Charles Taylor, The
Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM 25 (Amy Gutman ed., 1994) and LIONEL TRILLING,
SINCERITY AND AUTHENTICITY (1972).
9. See Becker, supra note 4.
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expressing societal values.11 Taking into account these important legal functions,
the conventional view is that policy makers should aspire to increase the
likelihood that people will take the existence of the law into account when
making decisions.
While in certain contexts it is desirable to increase awareness of the ex post
legal results of activity, the conventional view does not take into account the
distorting effect of the law on the ability of an individual to act in a way that
would represent his or her genuine preferences, moral perception, and true
economic interests. When the law becomes too dominant in the decisionmaking process, it results in manipulative behavior and excessive reliance on
strategic reasoning. This eventually undermines efficiency, autonomy,
distributive justice, and psychological welfare.
Finding the right balance between the positive role of the law to guide
behavior and its negative distorting effect is a challenging task. While we do not
espouse a complete solution to this problem, we explore three types of
situations where the distorting effect of the law has negative results. In such
circumstances, decreasing the saliency of the law during decision-making
enhances autonomy, efficiency, distributive justice, and personal well-being,
while at the same time narrows undesirable effects, such as commodification12
and crowding-out.13 This demonstrates why lawmakers should take seriously the
distorting effect of the law, as well as the potential harm caused by partial
masking through legal ambiguity and over-reliance on the law.
B. Moral Hazards and the Ex Post Versus Ex Ante Functions of the Law
The first type of situation in which the veil of uncertainty is beneficial is
when policy makers desire to provide legal relief ex post without changing ex
ante decision-making. Separation between ex post and ex ante perceptions can
help distinguish between the two functions of law—guidance and
responsiveness—and ensure that the second function will not undermine the
first.14 Ex ante, the law’s main function is to guide behavior, while ex post, its
main function is to respond to situations that people may face. In its guiding
role, the law should motivate people to engage in behaviors that will be good
10. See Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist Regulation of Spousal
Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1591–92 (2009) (emphasizing the law’s ability to shape
social institutions, such as cohabitation).
11. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2022–24
(1996).
12. For a discussion of the concept of commodification, see Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women’s
Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71, 81–83 (1990) and Margaret Jane Radin, MarketInalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1930–33 (1987).
13. For an account of the psychological process of crowding-out motivation, see infra note 20 and
accompanying text.
14. See P.S. Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judicial Process
and the Law, 65 IOWA L. REV. 1249, 1251 (1979–1980) (discussing the decreased willingness of judges
and legislatures to adhere to harsh principles in order to promote desirable behavior and deter
undesirable behavior).
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for society as a whole. In its responsive function, however, the law helps people
who are in dire situations with little regard to their ex ante intentions.
This separation between the two functions of the law is obviously difficult.
There is a fear that the law’s responsive role will undermine its guiding one.
This problem was addressed by Meir Dan-Cohen’s acoustic separation
argument in criminal law. According to Dan-Cohen, conveying one message to
the general public and another to the enforcing authorities may ensure that the
relief given to people who fall under an excuse defense, ex post, does not affect
their ex ante behavior.15 Our first type dealing with the distorting effect of law is
based on a related concept. We view the problem addressed by Dan-Cohen in
the context of criminal law as a more general one: people who are aware of the
legal reaction to their ex post status might be in a morally hazardous situation
where they will be guided by the responsive function of the law. Masking the
law may prevent inefficient moves by individuals who would rely ex ante on ex
post solutions. Beyond the moral-hazard rationale, masking the law is desirable
because it ensures that the ex post relief is given only to those who did not
choose to be in that status strategically, ex ante. Because part of the justification
for the ex post relief is that people find themselves in a situation unwillingly, the
mechanism of masking the law will ensure that relief is given only to people
who find themselves in dire situations despite good-faith attempts to avoid such
predicaments.
Bankruptcy law exemplifies a legal scenario where the ex ante–ex post
tensions justify masking the law. Ex ante, the debtor assumes full responsibility
over the debt when making the economic decision of whether to take a loan and
how to invest it. However, if the debtor is unable to pay back the loan, the law
provides relief through various legal arrangements. If the debtor knew ex ante
the exact nature of the ex post legal relief, there is a potential for morally
hazardous behavior by the debtor.16 Furthermore, according to our second
justification for masking the law, when people are unaware of their ex post legal
status, ex ante, there is greater moral justification for protecting them.17

15. Dan-Cohen, supra note 5, at 633.
16. See Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts?, 35 J. CORP. L. 469, 485–86
(addressing the role of moral hazards in bankruptcy law).
17. In Part V, which focuses on legal implications, we shall return to these examples with greater
focus on the legal design. We will also demonstrate a second scenario in family law with regard to the
distinction between the economic relationship between married partners and that of cohabitants. Ex
ante, the distinction between marriage and cohabitation commitments is justified because it provides a
“screening mechanism” for spouses to express their different preferences. According to this view, the
distinction between marriage and cohabitation does not reflect the superiority of marriage, but rather
the advantage of diversity of spousal institutions. Ex post, however, cohabitation law should impose on
cohabitants the responsive components of marriage law that aims to prevent exploitation and protect
weaker parties in the relationship. Masking the ex post responsive effect of the law may help to
preserve the ex ante effect of the screening mechanism.
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C. Ensuring Genuine Choice
The case for masking the law extends beyond separation of ex post and ex
ante and applies even when one has to choose ex ante between two legitimate
courses of action. This second type deals with a situation where the desirability
of a certain course of action taken by an individual may be achieved only when
it is done for non-strategic reasons. Thus, we argue that when law has too big of
a role in one’s motivations, it may jeopardize the purpose of the law itself. In
these scenarios, the policy maker is indifferent to the course of action taken by
the individual as long as it is not chosen as a way to circumvent the law.
Tax law is a good example of the benefits that may arise from masking the
law. While the conventional view emphasizes the advantages of certainty and
clarity in tax law,18 recent innovative lines of literature suggest that strategic tax
planning may lead to inefficient results.19 Converging this line of scholarship
with our second type suggests that the legal policy maker should differentiate
between a transaction that takes place for genuine economic reasons and
another transaction done purely for tax-avoidance purposes. A mechanism that
masks the ex post tax status of a given transaction will increase the chance that
people will behave authentically in accordance with their true economic
preferences.
Another classic example is in employment law, where the legal policy maker
is willing to recognize that not all long-term hiring relationships between people
are employment relationships. People may be legitimately hired as either
employees or as independent contractors if the choice is driven by genuine
economic and organizational rationales, but not when it is driven primarily for
the purpose of gaining legal benefits. Given that employing an individual as a
contractor might relieve the employer of the responsibility for providing
employment benefits, it is sometimes tempting for employers to define their
employees as service providers for that reason alone. When getting these legal
benefits is the dominant factor in the choice of how to define the relationship,
the law might distort one’s behavior. Furthermore, in the context of
employment law, there is a concern that the asymmetric bargaining power
might allow employers to behave strategically and manipulate the law to their
advantage at the expense of employees’ rights. In sum, when the motivation for
an action is crucial for its desirability, using legal techniques that hide the ex
post legal consequences of those actions is justified.

18. See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967) (choosing to retain a bright-line rule
instead of a case-by-case approach, thereby avoiding uncertainty and excessive litigation).
19. See David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 224 (2002)
(“Anytime anyone alters his behavior because of taxes we have the same problem—the changed
behavior imposed cost on others that the person does not take into account.”). But see Leo Katz, In
Defense of Tax Shelters, 26 VA. TAX REV. 799, 800–01 (2007) (responding to Weisbach’s arguments).
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D. Shielding Altruistic Motivation
The third type is related to the context of pro-social behaviors where the
action taken may be generally desirable, but when taken to achieve legal or
economic benefits, may cause harm to the individual or to society at large. The
harm might occur due to psychological processes such as crowding-out
motivation or sociological processes such as commodification.
Crowding-out literature suggests that when people base their behavior on
external rewards, they discount moral incentives for their behavior, thereby
lowering the effect of intrinsic motivation. As applied to the regulation of prosocial behavior, this theory would predict that saliency of the law in decisionmaking would undermine intrinsic motivations.20 For instance, paying people in
return for their blood may lead donors to view the event as a transaction rather
than as a charitable act, thereby reducing altruistic blood donations.21 Edward
Deci, Richard Koestner, and Richard Ryan have argued that “tangible rewards
tend to have a substantially negative effect on intrinsic motivation.”22 They warn
that attempts to externally control behavior may yield long-term
counterproductive results. An interesting twist in the crowding-out motivation
approach comes from research conducted on image motivation in the context of
incentives. According to a study conducted by Dan Ariely and his colleagues,
the effect of extrinsic motivation on intrinsic motivation is highly related to the
way in which one perceives that he or she is viewed by society. In their study,
the negative effect of incentives was evident only when the behavior was
conducted in public—when others were watching—not when the behavior was
done in a private setting.23 This modification of the theory suggests that the
uncertainty effect is needed not only for the individual, but also for the
individual’s view of how he or she is perceived by others, given that the
individual engages in pro-social behaviors due to extrinsic motivation.

20. See Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, 46 EUR. ECON. REV.
687, 713–19 (2002) (discussing the psychological process of crowding-out and its relevance to
economics); Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on Human Altruism,
422 NATURE 137, 140 (2003) (presenting research that “suggests that economic incentives cause mainly
negative effects on altruistic cooperation if they come in the form of sanctions and if they are associated
with greedy or selfish intentions”); Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, Do Incentive Contracts Undermine
Voluntary Cooperation? 1 (Univ. of Zurich Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Working Paper No.
34, 2002) (presenting research indicating that incentive contracts undermine voluntary cooperation to
such a degree that these contracts are less efficient than fixed-price contracts).
21. RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY
314 (Ann Oakley & John Ashton eds., 1997) (arguing that payments to blood donors could diminish the
quality and quantity of donations).
22. Edward L. Deci, Richard Koestner & Richard M. Ryan, A Meta-Analytic Review of
Experiments Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL.
627, 658–59 (1999).
23. Dan Ariely, Anat Bracha & Stephan Meier, Doing Good or Doing Well? Image Motivation and
Monetary Incentives in Behaving Prosocially 17 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Bos., Working Paper No. 07-9,
2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =1010620.
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Aside from the crowding-out literature, the commodification scholarship
suggests that certain attributes of one’s humanity, such as family, religion, love,
sexuality, friendship, and altruism, are integral parts of the “self” and should
not be a part of a commercial relationship. Commodification scholars argue that
commodification can impact not only the meaning of such attributes for
individuals, but also the meaning of social interactions in general.24
In the legal context, the conventional literature on crowding-out and
commodification usually concludes with a call for delegalization as well as a call
for a reduction in the use of monetary incentives for activities where intrinsic
motivation is expected to function relatively effectively.25 This solution is
problematic, however, in those circumstances where the pro-social behavior at
issue is costly or risky and, therefore, would justify a monetary incentive. In
such cases, a mechanism which could provide benefits ex post without revealing
the benefits ex ante is preferable to a situation providing no benefits at all or
one revealing the benefits ex ante. Classic examples of this type of situation are
organ donation and surrogacy contracting, where society sees such action as
desirable but fears the inadvertent effect of financial incentives on the donors.
The concerns of crowding-out and commodification are powerful in many
countries where there is strong resistance to giving any type of economic benefit
in such contexts. In other countries, the state financially incentivizes such
behaviors, as they are viewed as socially desirable. Masking the law through a
mechanism which would ensure that no price tag could be put on an organ or a
baby ex ante, but which could still ensure certain compensation ex post, would
provide the best of both worlds.
An even greater challenge arises in the third type of situation where the veil
of uncertainty is beneficial in contrast to the previous two. To encourage a
certain behavior, the promise of a legal benefit must be communicated to
people ex ante in a manner that encourages the action without generating a
crowding-out effect (resulting in decreased action after the introduction of the
legal benefit). Therefore, the main dilemma in masking the role of law in prosocial behavior is whether it is possible to increase pro-social behavior through
law without harming the altruistic motivations of people who choose to engage
in such activities.
Table 1 presents our taxonomy of the three types of legal contexts where
partial ignorance of the law is desirable.

24. See Radin, supra note 12, at 1851 (arguing that the line between alienability and inalienability
should be drawn based on the “concept of human flourishing” rather than on pure economic analysis).
25. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 13–14 (2000)
(presenting research indicating that small penalties for undesirable behavior may increase the incidence
of such behavior); Deci, Koestner & Ryan, supra note 22; see also Tsilly Dagan, Itemizing Personhood,
29 VA. TAX REV. 93, 131–33 (2009) (demonstrating how in the tax law context, one can take the
commodification literature into account without going all the way to full delegalization of non-market
relationships).

FELDMAN & LIFSHITZ

142

3/6/2011

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 74:133

Table 1: Taxonomy of Types Masking the Law
Type

The Ex Ante
Position of the
Law
Prefers option
A over option
B

The Ex Post
Position of the
Law
Benefits option B
despite ex ante
undesirability

Ensuring Genuine
Choices

Neutral to
options A and
B

Benefits options A
or B as long as the
selection reflects
genuine choice

Shielding Altruistic
Motivation

Prefers option
A over B

Benefits option A
regardless of the
motivation

Moral Hazard and
the Ex Post Versus
Ex Ante Functions
of the Law

The Merits of Masking the
Law

Examples

Acoustic separation effect
* Ensuring that ex post
considerations will not
undermine the directive
ex ante function of the law
* Preventing moral hazard
* Ensuring that ex post
benefits will be provided
only to those who are
morally deserving
Ensuring genuine choice:
* Efficiency—preventing
the distorting effect of the
law
* Distributive Justice—
preventing manipulative
avoidance of legal duties
Encouraging the
experience of noninstrumental factors as
dominant, initiating prosocial behavior;
preventing crowding-out
and commodification

Bankruptcy
law

Tax law,
Employment
law

Surrogacy
law;
organ and
blood
donation

III
LEGAL UNCERTAINTY AS A VEIL OF IGNORANCE
Part II presented a taxonomy of three types of situations where masking the
law ex ante is desired. The nature of this legal masking was not developed,
however. This part offers legal uncertainty as a possible solution. To make this
argument, we rely on theories and methodologies of the behavioral analysis of
law. First, this part looks for support in behavioral-research literature, which
argues that when the meaning of the law is uncertain, people will likely diminish
their reliance on legal benefits during the deliberation process. Following that
stage, it presents an experimental survey that empirically tests these
propositions.
A. Behavioral Consequences of Legal Uncertainty
Classical expected-utility paradigms suggest that under conditions of
uncertainty, people should multiply the likelihood of an event with their utility
from the payout associated with that event. Further research has taken into
account the notion of risk perception, adding another dimension to our
understanding of one’s preference for value that derives from probabilistic
events. Psychological research has documented the factors that moderate one’s
attitude toward risk; famous among them is the prospect theory, which
differentiates between attitudes toward risk with regard to gains and with
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regard to losses.26 Furthermore, in contexts where the probability of an event
occurring is unknown, cognitive psychologists have developed different
concepts to account for the way people react to ambiguous information.27 In that
regard, it is generally accepted that people have an aversion toward events with
an ambiguous probability of occurring.28
Amos Tversky and Eldar Shafir have termed the concept “disjunction
effect” to account for people’s reluctance to think through different possibilities
that may arise from events whose likelihood of occurring is unknown to them.29
Following this line of research, Eric Van Dijk and Marcel Zeelenberg have
shown that when people are faced with ambiguous information, they give
possible outcomes much less weight in the decision-making process.30
Furthermore, in some cases, ambiguous information could have the same effect
as no information.31 Uri Gneezy and his colleagues developed the concept of the
“uncertainty effect” to account for the fact that people are not willing to pay for
a gift card whose benefits are uncertain, even when the expected value is much
greater than the cost of the card. Using various techniques, they demonstrated
that people preferred a fixed amount of money over a gamble between two
options, even when both options were higher than the sum of money offered in
the fixed option.32 Thus, even when the least desired outcome was greater than
the fixed option, it was less likely to be preferred in both gambling settings and
incentive settings. This effect, combined with the disjunction effect discussed
above, suggests that by making legal benefits ambiguous, we may cause people
to downplay their importance rather than engage in probabilistic calculation of
outcomes, an option which is obviously less desirable for the argument we wish
to develop in this paper.
In contrast to the wealth and variety of research conducted in psychology,
research on decision-making under uncertainty in law has focused only on
limited aspects of uncertainty. Many of the papers on uncertainty in law are
focused on criticizing Gary Becker’s view on deterrence.33 Many have criticized
26. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
27. See Deborah Frisch & Jonathan Baron, Ambiguity and Rationality, 1 J. BEHAV. DECISION
MAKING 149, 152 (1988) (discussing the definition of ambiguity).
28. Gideon Keren & Léonie E.M. Gerritsen, On the Robustness and Possible Accounts of
Ambiguity Aversion, 103 ACTA PSYCHOL. 149, 169–71 (1999) (recognizing the phenomenon of
ambiguity avoidance and discussing possible explanations).
29. Amos Tversky & Eldar Shafir, The Disjunction Effect in Choice Under Uncertainty, 3
PSYCHOL. SCI. 305, 306 (1992). It should be admitted that the disjunction effect may be limited to
ambiguity with regard to a specific event, which is narrower than the broader claim we wish to develop
in our project.
30. See Eric Van Dijk & Marcel Zeelenberg, The Discounting of Ambiguous Information in
Economic Decision Making, 16 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 341, 350–51 (2003).
31. See id. at 342.
32. Uri Gneezy et al., The Uncertainty Effect: When a Risky Prospect Is Valued Less Than Its Worst
Possible Outcome, 121 Q.J. ECON. 1283, 1284 (2006).
33. See Becker, supra note 4, at 183–84 (presenting analysis of probability of conviction, length of
punishment, and other variables as determinants of number of criminal offenses).
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the Becker model for treating changes in the severity of a sanction and in the
probability of detection as identical, arguing that potential criminals are more
sensitive to changes in the probability of detection than to changes in the size of
a sanction.34
In a series of two papers, Alon Harel and his colleagues employ insights
from cognitive psychology to compare the way potential criminals treat
uncertainty concerning sanction size and the probability of detection.35 These
studies focus mainly on how individuals evaluate the probability of detection in
a criminal-law context. Additionally, there are some lines of research that focus
on behavioral effects of legal ambiguity in the civil context.36 In the contexts of
tax law and information sharing, researchers have focused on how the law can
help people overcome their ambiguity aversion when avoiding a behavior is
inefficient.37
In the legal context, some research, while not using the terminology of
disjunction, suggests that legal uncertainty decreases the influence of the law on
people’s decision-making beyond what would have been predicted under utility
theory and risk-aversion research. Viewing legal uncertainty as different from
uncertainty in decision-making, Yuval Feldman and Alon Harel have shown
that when faced with legal ambiguity, people rely primarily on social norms to
decide how to behave.38 Their paper demonstrates that people are strategic in
their choice of social reference group and that legal ambiguity is a key factor in
moderating reliance on the behavior of others. Feldman and Doron Teichman
have shown the difference between uncertainty in a law’s meaning and
uncertainty in enforcement. They have demonstrated empirically that the legal
uncertainty affected not only the instrumental, deterrence-related effects of law,
but also the expressive meaning of the law.39 Their paper demonstrates how the
type of law as well as its association with uncertainty moderates the effect of
legal uncertainty on behavior.
Although these studies focus on how uncertainty leads people to understand
the law differently, they do not directly address the disjunction effect, whereby
uncertainty causes people to ignore the law in full or in part. In this paper, we

34. See, e.g., Harold G. Grasmick & George J. Bryjak, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Severity of
Punishment, 59 SOC. FORCES 471, 486 (1980–1981) (suggesting that perceived severity has significant
deterrent effect at relatively high levels of perceived certainty).
35. Harel & Segal, supra note 3; Tom Baker, Alon Harel & Tamar Kugler, The Virtues of
Uncertainty in Law: An Experimental Approach, 89 IOWA L. REV. 443, 486–87 (2004).
36. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, Death, Taxes and Cognition, 81 N.C. L. REV. 567, 578–93 (2003)
(discussing people’s behavior with regard to estate-tax planning).
37. See Amitai Aviram & Avishalom Tor, Overcoming Impediments to Information Sharing, 55
ALA. L. REV. 231, 248–50 (2004); Terrance R. Chorvat, Ambiguity and Income Taxation, 23 CARDOZO
L. REV. 617, 640–45 (2002) (advocating a low or zero tax rate for foreign investments to overcome
investors’ ambiguity-based preference for domestic funds).
38. Yuval Feldman & Alon Harel, Social Norms, Self-Interest and Ambiguity of Legal Norms: An
Experimental Analysis of the Rule vs. Standard Dilemma, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 81, 98–99 (2008).
39. Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Legal Probabilities Created Equal?, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 980, 985 (2009).
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suggest a more dramatic change in the way people react to legal uncertainty
than has been argued for in the disjunction effect suggested by Tversky and
Shafir40 or the uncertainty effect suggested by Gneezy and his colleagues.41 More
specifically, we argue that legal ambiguity might cause people to undermine
their consideration for the law altogether and resort to alternative motivational
causes—their true preferences. Thus, our focus is not on how people make
decisions under conditions of uncertainty, but rather how people might avoid
taking legality of their actions into account and choose alternative paths of
behavior when the law cannot give them certainty. Furthermore, in contrast to
the surveyed literature on uncertainty in law that focuses mainly on legal costs
and the deterrent power of ambiguity, our focus is on legal benefits and, hence,
transcends the deterrence-related discussion of ambiguity. We aim to
demonstrate empirically that legal uncertainty can mask some of the distorting
ex ante effects of the law. If indeed we succeed, our effort to provide a
mechanism which could mask the law ex ante will likely receive some
behavioral support.
B. Empirical Demonstration
Based on the review of literature on the disjunction effect, the following
empirical demonstration explores, in a legal context, the gap between the
impact of certain probabilistic and ambiguous legal benefits on one’s legal
preferences. To achieve this goal, we randomly divided our sample into four
groups. Each group was presented with an identical employment-law dilemma
that differed only in the likelihood of getting a legal benefit associated with
choosing a certain type of legal regime. The goal was to compare between the
influence of certain, probabilistic, and ambiguous legal benefits relative to a
situation where no legal benefit was offered.42
1. Sample and Design
The data collection method was web-based, using the survey firm, Panels.
The firm holds a panel of volunteers who earn online rewards in return for
filling out a survey. The sample of the survey was drawn from a diverse,
representative panel of 438 Israeli adults. All participants were presented with
the following identical scenario, which is based on a typical employment-law
dilemma:
Assume that you are looking for an accountant for a firm that you own. You wonder
whether it makes more sense to employ him as your employee or as a contractor. If
you choose the first route, then you gain greater ability to supervise his working hours
and greater control over the way the work is being done. In contrast, if you choose the
second option, then the payment will be based on output, but you will not have any
control over the working hours or the way the work will be done.

40. See Tversky & Shafir, supra note 29.
41. See Gneezy et al., supra note 32.
42. When referring to legal benefits, we include also saving future legal costs.
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Following this description, which was the same for all subgroups of the
sample, an experimental manipulation took place. In this manipulation, the
legal ramifications of choosing to take the second route were phrased in four
different ways, each given to one of the four randomly selected subgroups of
the sample:
1. No external rewards mentioned. In this group, no reference to legal
benefits was made, and participants were expected to make their decision based
on organizational differences between the two types of employment.
2. Legal reward under the condition of ambiguity. In this group,
participants were told the following:
Assume that, according to the law that regulates employment relations in Israel, if you
choose to employ the accountant as a contractor rather than as an employee, you could
save 5,000 NIS per month because of various legal benefits you will not need to pay
(e.g. employer’s tax, severance pay, and other social benefits). Nonetheless, there is a
possibility that the court will intervene and would declare that the accountant is your
employee and then you will save nothing on legal grounds.

3. Legal reward under the condition of uncertainty, with probabilities
provided. In this group, participants were told the following:
Assume that, according to the law that regulates employment relations in Israel, if you
choose to employ the accountant as a contractor rather than as an employee, you
could save 5,000 NIS per month because of various legal benefits you will not need to
pay (e.g. employer’s tax, severance pay, and other social benefits). Nonetheless, there
43
is an 80% chance that the court will intervene and would declare that the accountant
is your employee and then you will save nothing on legal grounds.

4. Certain external rewards. In this group, participants were told the
following:
Assume that, according to the law that regulates employment relations in Israel, if you
choose to employ the accountant as a contractor rather than as an employee, you
would certainly save 1,000 NIS per month because of various legal benefits you will
not need to pay (e.g. employer’s tax, severance pay, and other social benefits).

43. We recognize that using low probabilities limits the ability of our findings to generalize in terms
of other situations with higher probabilities.
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For each factual scenario and legal mechanism, we measured the following
variables:44
1. Intention45 of self and others to choose a certain employment
pattern
2. Whether the legal arrangement taken is profitable and fair
from the employee perspective
3. What the most suitable legal arrangement for the described
setting would be
4. Risk attitudes
5. Demographics
2. Findings
a. Effect of Certainty on Self Versus Others
We start our analysis by examining whether the different ways of framing
the certainty of legal benefits affected (1) what participants themselves would
choose and (2) what participants expected that others would choose. Using an
“Analysis of Variance”46 controlling for demographics and attitudes toward risk
(MANCOVA47),48 we find that the legal instrument subgroups did indeed differ
significantly with regard to the measures of the employment preference.49
Univariate tests revealed that the effect was significant for both measures of the
preferred form of employment,50 with a higher preference for employing a
salaried employee found within the No External Reward scenario (No External

44. In addition, we have also measured an elaborate demographic profile to account for risk
preferences. This last factor was used as the control in all of the presented analyses.
45. We rely on the concept of intention developed by Icek Ajzen. See Icek Ajzen, The Theory of
Planned Behavior, 50 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 179, 181 (1991) (“Intentions are
assumed to capture the motivational factors that influence a behavior; they are indications of how hard
people are willing to try, of how much of an effort they are planning to exert, in order to perform the
behavior.”).
46. ANOVA, a univariate analysis of variance, aims to identify the sources of variance among
participants. In contrast to MANOVA, ANOVA involves only one dependent variable.
47. MANCOVA and ANCOVA are similar procedures to MANOVA and ANOVA, respectively.
The major difference is that MANCOVA and ANCOVA control for the influence of a supplementary
independent variable (a covariate) such as demographics and attitudes toward risk.
48. While the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed that the legal instrument
subgroups did not differ significantly on the risk-attitudes measure, the measure, which was expected to
be associated with the outcome factors, was included as a covariate in the analyses to be reported. A
similar pattern of results emerged without covariating for the risk attitudes and, therefore, the possible
effect of the measure as a competing explanation for the participants’ outcomes was substantially
reduced. Covariating for the three background variables revealed similar patterns of results unless
reported otherwise.
2
49. Multivariate F(6, 864)=7.45, p<.001, η =.05.
2
50. Self as an Employer: F(3, 433)=6.79, p<.001, η =.04; The Majority as an Employer: F (3,
2
433)=12.20, p<.001, η =.08.
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Reward), followed by the Legal Reward Under the Condition of Ambiguity
scenario (Ambiguous Reward), the External Reward—Probabilistic Reasoning
scenario (Probabilistic Reward), and the Certain External Reward scenario
(Certain Reward).
In accordance with the hypothesis,51 we found that for the measure of selfdecision, the scenarios of No External Reward and Probabilistic Reward
generated a significantly higher preference for the salaried employee than did
the Certain Reward (all p’s < .05). We found that for the measure of the
decision participants expected others to make, however, the No External
Reward scenario generated a significantly higher preference for occupying a
salaried employee than did the scenarios of Ambiguous Reward, Probabilistic
Reward, and Certain Reward (all p’s < .05). This gap in the ambiguity effect
might be related to the fact that part of the reason for ambiguity aversion is
related to a self-defense mechanism. Thus, when asked to evaluate the behavior
of others, the discount associated with an ambiguity aversion is smaller.52
Table 2 presents the adjusted mean scores (M) and standard deviations
(SD) of the measures of the preferred form of employment as a function of the
legal instrument. Figure 1 presents the ranking of the legal instruments with
regard to these measures.
Table 2: The Adjusted Mean Scores and Standard Deviations of the
Measures of the Preferred Employment Format as a Function of the Legal
Instrument
No Reward
Measures of the
Preferred
Occupational
Arrangement
Self (Intention)
Most Others

M

SD

63.42
62.00

27.47
24.30

The Legal Instrument
Ambiguous
Probabilistic
Reward
Reward
M
SD
M
SD

59.39
49.02

27.12
27.76

58.64
46.23

27.49
27.05

Certain
Reward
M
SD

47.05
40.84

31.14
29.00

Comment: Controlling for the level of tendency for taking risks.

51. This hypothesis is based on the Bonferroni post-hoc test, which helps to address the problem of
multiple comparisons.
52. For a discussion of the sources of the “self-other gap,” see Nicholas Epley & David Dunning,
Feeling “Holier Than Thou”: Are Self-Serving Assessments Produced by Errors in Self- or Social
Prediction?, 79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 861, 861–62 (2000) (discussing why people tend to
hold more charitable views of themselves than of others). For a discussion of the gap in the legal
context, see Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of
Rewards, Liabilities, Duties and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1153–54
(2010) (examining the effect of various regulatory mechanisms on social enforcement patterns).
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Figure 1: Preferred Legal Arrangement (Self)
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Therefore, as one can see from the analysis and from the graph, our
hypothesis was confirmed: when legal benefits are provided through uncertain
rules, their effect on the reported intention of individuals will be diminished.
Not only did certain legal benefits have a stronger effect on participants’
decisions than uncertain legal benefits, but the effects of both probabilistic and
ambiguous legal benefits were no stronger than the effect of no legal benefit.
While the weak effect of the Ambiguous Reward was expected according to the
behavioral literature, the theoretical basis for the limited effect of the
Probabilistic Reward was weaker. This effect could be explained by the
uniqueness of legal uncertainty, which was shown above to have different
53
effects than typical ambiguous information.

53. See Feldman & Teichman, supra note 39, at 1009–11 (finding that because of law’s expressive
nature, clear law significantly affects behavior even if enforcement is uncertain or unlikely).
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b. Who Is More Likely To Be Affected by Certainty?
By examining whether the arrangement was desirable to employers, we can
identify how much people care about employees in their choice of employment
format. Examining the interaction between this factor and the manipulated
level of certainty of legal benefits, using a two-way MANCOVA, reveals the
following interesting interaction: the effect of the certainty of the law on the
measures of the preference of the form of employment changed according to
the level of the perceived desirability of the arrangement from the employee’s
perspective.
We divided our sample based on their evaluation of the desirability of their
54
chosen legal arrangement from the perspective of the employee. Only among
participants with a low or an intermediate positive perception of the
55
arrangement did the legal instrument have a significant effect on their choice.
Among participants with a low positive perception of the arrangement (that is,
those who did not care at all about the employee), the No External Reward
scenario generated a significantly higher “self” preference of employing a
56
salaried employee than did the scenario of Certain Reward. An even stronger
effect of certainty was found with regard to those with an intermediate positive
perception of the arrangement (that is, those who had a moderate regard for
the interest of their employee). All three legal rules (No External Reward,
Ambiguous Reward, and Probabilistic Reward) generated a significantly higher
“self” preference for the salaried employee than did the scenario of Certain
57
Reward. Among participants with a high positive perception of the
arrangement from the employee perspective, however, the certainty did not
have a significant effect on the measure (p > .05).
Figures 2–4 present the interaction effect between the certainty of the law
and the perceived desirability of the arrangement from the employee’s
perspective on the measures of the preference of the employment format
(n=438).

54. Participants were divided into three subgroups according to the thirty-third and sixty-sixth
percentiles of the measure of the perception of the arrangement from the employee’s perspective. Two
items were used to build this factor: q 4 (whether the chosen arrangement is profitable for the
employee) and q 8 (whether the chosen arrangement is fair for the employee).
55. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated
marginal means.
2
56. F(3, 425)=2.86, p<.05, η =.02.
2
57. F(3, 425)=3.24, p<.05, η =.02.
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Figure 2: Preference for the Contractor Arrangement Within the Low
Perceived Desirability Subgroup
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Figure 3: Preference for the Contractor Arrangement Within the
Intermediate Perceived Desirability Subgroup

60

59.78

60.52

60.47

Preference for 50
Employee
Status

43.81

40
30

No Rew ard

Am biguous
Rew ard

Probabilistic
Rew ard

Legal Instrument

Certain Rew ard

FELDMAN & LIFSHITZ

3/6/2011

152

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 74:133

Figure 4: Preference for the Contractor Arrangement Within the High
Perceived Desirability Subgroup
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For participants who are internally motivated and who have high regard for
the employee, neither the law nor its certainty affected their choice. In our
terminology, such people’s “original experience” will not be affected even by a
certain law; thus, creating a veil of ignorance by legislating uncertain law is not
needed. This is not the case with regard to people who have no regard for their
employee or, especially, moderate (or intermediate) regard for their employee.
For those two categories, we see that only legal certainty can shift their choice.
For such people, uncertainty was shown to be an effective tool in masking the
ability of ex post legal benefits to alter behavior.
A similar finding emerged when an interaction was examined with the factor
of “level of saving needed” (in terms of salary) for choosing the employee–
contractor option. This factor aimed at identifying the strength of participants’
preferences for either one of the employment formats offered to them.
The two-way MANCOVA revealed that the effect of the legal instrument
on the measures of the preference of the employment format changed
58
according to the level of the estimated reduction in the employee’s wage. Only
among participants with a low estimated reduction in the employee’s wage did
the legal instrument have a significant effect on their choice of legal

58. Participants were divided into three subgroups according to the thirty-third and sixty-sixth
percentiles of the measure of the perceived reduction in the employee’s wage.
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59

arrangement, with the conditions of No External Reward, Ambiguous Reward,
and Probabilistic Reward generating a significantly higher preference for the
60
salaried employee than the Certain Reward. Among participants with an
intermediate or a high estimated reduction in the employee’s wage, the
variation in the certainty of the law did not have a significant effect on the
measure (p’s > .05).
Thus, we see a similar interaction between level of certainty and strength of
preferences, as in the previous analysis. When participants require moderate to
high changes in costs to change their preferences, it is more difficult for either
61
law or certainty to alter their preferences. These two interactions, while
enriching our understanding of the mechanism through which certainty
operates, limit our ability to generalize in our argument, as they suggest that the
main effect of certainty discussed in the beginning of the findings section could
be attributed to certain types of people.
c. Subjective Experience of Uncertainty
Finally, we move on to explore the effect of certainty on one’s experience
through a “within subject” design rather than a “between subject” design. In
this part of the study, we asked participants to consciously ignore the benefits
that they had just read. MANCOVA analysis shows that the legal instrument
62
subgroups differed significantly with regard to the measure of the preference
63
of the employment format under the absence of economic considerations. In
accordance with the hypothesis, we found that the Certain Reward scenario
generated a significantly higher preference for employing a salaried employee
than did the two conditions of uncertainty.
This finding is consistent with our argument that uncertain rules are less
likely to interfere with one’s experience. Participants who were exposed to a
certain legal benefit that emerged from the law were unable to ignore this
benefit when requested to do so. Those participants who were asked to ignore
an uncertain benefit and even a probabilistic one, however, were more likely to
succeed in doing so.
Next, we reexamined the subjective experience of participants through the
“within subject” design. Here, participants’ success in ignoring the effect of the
law was compared with their original choice across four experimental
conditions.

59. These tests are based on the linearly independent pairwise comparisons among the estimated
marginal means.
2
60. F(3, 425)=4.55, p<.01, η =.03.
61. Note that with regard to the second interaction, certainty could not have had an effect when
neither type of law differed significantly from the control group for the moderate- to high-level
intensity of preferences.
62. Three subgroups were compared: High External Reward under Uncertainty, High External
Reward–Probabilistic Reasoning, and External Reward with Certain Probability.
2
63. F(2, 324)=5.52, p<.01, η =.03.
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To examine this fact, we looked at the participants’ responses when asked to
ignore the legal benefits associated with their choice and compared it to their
actual choice, which was done in response to the different framings of the law.
In the vignettes that participants were asked to read, a two-way MANCOVA
with repeated measures for the type of the preference of the employment
format with and without reference to the legal benefits was mentioned,
64
indicating a significant gap between the two measures.
More importantly, a significant interactive effect was found between the
65
preference of the employment format and the legal instrument. Within the
Certain Reward condition, the effect of the type of the preference of the
66
employment format was found to be significant. With regard to the other two
uncertainty conditions, however, there was no change when participants were
asked to note the preferences without taking into account the legal benefit.
Figure 5 presents the adjusted mean scores of the two measures as a function of
the legal instrument.
Figure 5: The Adjusted Mean Scores for the Measures of the Preference of
the Employment Format as a Function of the Observed or Expected Preference
and of the Legal Instrument (n=438).
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64. F(1, 324)=19.10, p<.001, η =.06; Expected Preference: M=72.62, SD=22.68; Observed Preference:
M=46.96, SD=31.14.
2
65. F(2, 324)=15.63, p<.001, η =.09.
2
66. F(1, 324)=62.02, p<.001, η =.16.
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When participants were asked to ignore the effect of a certain legal benefit,
there was a big shift in their behavior, which was even stronger than the
experimental effect of legal benefits. In contrast, under both conditions of
uncertainty, when participants were asked to ignore the effect of the law, they
did not make any significant change in their choices. This suggests not only that
uncertainty can mask the ex ante effect of law, but also, even in their own
subjective experience, the participants did not feel the need to adjust their true
preferences when they were asked to ignore an uncertain benefit.
C. Intermediate Summary: The Role of Uncertainty Within the Law
The empirical demonstration has led to three main findings regarding the
ways in which legal uncertainty causes people to behave according to their true
preferences. First, we have seen that getting legal benefits under conditions of
uncertainty, whether probabilities were provided or not, did not have a
significant effect on participants’ preferences for an employment arrangement.
Participants’ behavior was less affected by the benefits of law when those
benefits were uncertain. While the lack of effect of ambiguous legal benefits
was expected according to theories of ambiguity aversion, disjunction effect,
and uncertainty effect, it was less expected with regard to probabilistic
67
benefits. Because attitudes for risk were controlled for, it is unlikely that risk
aversion could explain this effect. It is possible that this effect replicates some of
the findings of Feldman and Teichman with regard to the uniqueness of legal
uncertainty and the diminishing expressive power that law has in such contexts,
68
even when probabilities are given. It is also possible that even when
probabilities are given, especially when they are low (for example, twenty
percent), the legal benefit is not seen by people as worth considering in their
own decision-making. Such effect is especially anticipated when people have
other indicators on how to decide. In contrast to the classic decision-underuncertainty studies, where the individual is required to give a dollar value to a
probabilistic value, here, people have an option to avoid this tedious process by
following their true desires.
Another caveat is that the effect of certainty works differently with regard
to self-decision and with regard to what participants thought others would do.
Here, probabilistic benefits and, to a lesser extent, ambiguous benefits, did have
an effect on participants’ evaluations of what type of arrangements people
might choose.
This caveat is important for several reasons. First, it demonstrates that the
manipulation was working well, for only in the uncertain groups was there a
difference between what people wanted to do and what people thought others
would do. Second, it suggests the motivational nature of ambiguity avoidance is

67. This second type of uncertain benefit was slightly stronger than the first type, but still no
significant effect was present.
68. See Feldman & Teichman, supra note 39, at 1010–11.
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weaker with regard to a decision not taken by the individual himself or herself.
Therefore, in those areas where we are not interested in affecting the individual
but rather social norms, ambiguity is expected to be less effective in masking the
law.
Our second finding is related to the interaction between the effect of
uncertainty and the strength of an individual’s preference for one of the
employment arrangements. We have shown that for participants who are
internally motivated and have high regard for the employee, neither the law nor
its certainty affected their choice. For such people, their “authentic experience”
was not affected by certainty in the law. This is not so for people who have little
regard for employees or have moderate regard for employee interests. For
those two categories of participants, we see the benefits of uncertainty as a
mask on the law. Certain legal benefits shifted their choice, while uncertain law,
either ambiguous or probabilistic, did not have a significant effect on the choice
of occupational arrangement. Therefore, for people with weak to moderate
regard for employees, uncertainty was an effective tool in masking the ability of
the law to alter behavior. A similar effect was found when the analysis was
conducted with regard to the level of reduction in salary costs needed for
employers to choose the employee’s status.
Third, when participants were asked to ignore the effect of certain legal
benefits, there was a substantial shift in their behavior, which was even stronger
than the original experimental effect of legal benefits. This effect might be
related to the “endowment effect,” where maintaining a legal right one already
possesses is valued more highly than obtaining a new legal right that one was
never entitled to before. In contrast, under both conditions of uncertainty, when
participants were asked to ignore the effect of the law, they did not make any
significant change in their choices. This suggests that even in their own
subjective experience, they did not feel the need to adjust their true preferences
when they were asked to ignore an uncertain legal benefit. This last finding
completes our understanding of the importance of uncertainty in weakening
law’s influence on people’s experience and behavior.
Uncertainty was shown to be, at least in an artificial replication of real-life
decision-making, significantly different than certain legal benefits. This fact
demonstrates the potential for using uncertainty to mask the ex ante effect of
law in the legal areas discussed above. Obviously, there are important
limitations that we need to consider when attempting to use data taken from
web-based experimental surveys, which basically only measure attitudes about
real-life legal settings. In our experimental design, people did not risk anything
in their responses and were faced with a somewhat unrealistic dichotomous
dilemma. Nonetheless, as an empirical demonstration for the difference in
treatment of uncertain and ambiguous legal benefits, we do believe that our
study contributes to the theoretical argument of this paper.
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IV
THE INADVERTENT CONSEQUENCES OF LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
Part III demonstrated that uncertainty might serve as a tool to mask the
parts of the law which are shown to be disruptive. However, masking the law is
not always a desirable goal. Furthermore, even in those situations where
masking the law is socially desirable, uncertainty still carries some inadvertent
effects which may limit its usage. Part IV presents these inadvertent effects and
balances them with the advantages of uncertainty.
A. Excessive Litigation
According to conventional wisdom, uncertainty is one of the causes for
69
excessive and inefficient litigation. Recent research reveals, however, a more
complex picture of the relationship between uncertainty and litigation. In some
circumstances, due to risk and ambiguity aversion, uncertainty may encourage
compromise. Furthermore, in ongoing relationships, uncertainty may lead
litigants to neglect their legal rights and to focus instead on their future needs
70
and preferences. Given the complex and rich effects of uncertainty, the fear
from excessive litigation should not prevent the policy maker from exploring
the benefits of uncertainty.
B. Distributive Concerns
The effect of uncertainty may vary among people of different educational
and socioeconomic statuses. Variation may occur ex ante, ex post, or during the
period in between. This may have a significant distributive justice effect that
lawmakers should be taking into account.
1. The Ex Ante Distributive Effect on Uncertainty
According to our analysis, legal uncertainty provides the mechanism for
masking the legal consequences of an action and, therefore, enhances
authenticity. Uncertainty, however, never achieves the pure effect of masking
the law, as people gather some information about courts’ ex post decisions
regarding the uncertain rules. This ex post information is not equally accessed
and understood by everyone. “Repeat players” are naturally more exposed to
such information and are usually more motivated to gather and analyze the ex

69. See, e.g., Michael S. Wilk & Rik H. Zafar, Mediation of a Bankruptcy Case, 22 AM. BANKR.
INST. J. 12, 60 (2003) (“[M]ediation gives the parties the control of determining the outcome of the
dispute and avoids the uncertainty inherent in all litigation.”). In the context of contract law, see
Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814,
836–37 (2006) (discussing the trade-offs between precise terms, which are more costly to negotiate, and
vague terms, which may lead to inefficient litigation).
70. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social Norms Theory of
Incomplete Contracts, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 218 (2009) (arguing that parties strengthen their
relationships by jointly accepting vulnerability “to costly and uncertain enforcement” through
ambiguous contract terms).
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post information. Thus, uncertain rules may increase the power gap between
71
repeat players and “first-timers.”
Although asymmetric information has a clear distributive effect that should
be taken into account, uncertainty does not necessarily work against
economically weaker parties. First, the premise that both first-timers and repeat
players are familiar with the legal implications of certain rules is not always
true. In some cases, first-timers or economically weaker parties are wholly
ignorant about the content of the law. In those cases, uncertainty reduces the
knowledge advantage rather than increase it.
Second, making it harder for people to gather full knowledge of the law ex
ante will primarily harm the more affluent members of society. After all, the
employers or rich taxpayers are among the first of those who usually attempt to
72
behave strategically with regard to the law. This should work in the favor of
first-timers, such as economically weaker parties.
Finally and most importantly, even if repeat players get legal advice ex ante,
which could transform an ambiguous situation into a probabilistic one, our
findings demonstrate that in the legal context, the discount for ambiguous legal
information works even when the legal reward is probabilistic. This means that
even if repeat players do indeed have more information ex ante about the
possible results of litigation than do first-timers, the disjunction effect still
undermines the practical results of these differences. Furthermore, our findings
reveal that the disjunction effect does not interact with participants’ risk
attitude. This might narrow the distributive effect, which could be attributed to
the gap in attitudes toward risk-taking among participants.
2. Bargaining in the Shadow of Uncertainty
We have argued that ex ante ambiguity will not result in a systematic
distributive effect in favor of the economically superior parties even in cases of
asymmetric information and differences in risk-taking. Yet, the ex ante
advantage of uncertainty may carry inadvertent normative and behavioral
effects with regard to ex post litigation decisions. From a normative perspective,
in the ex post stage, the need to maintain ex ante genuine choice is no longer
present, and the focus moves to ensuring that weaker parties will be able to
73
protect their legal rights. On the behavioral front, when an individual decides
whether to engage in ex post litigation, the legal ambiguity may be substituted
for non-legal considerations. That is why in this stage, there is a need to refine
our argument for masking the law, keeping in mind legal rights.

71. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–104 (1974–1975) (contrasting the characteristics of and strategies
used by “repeat players” and “one-shotters”).
72. See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 1 (explaining the effects of uncertainty in terms of
deterrence); Harel & Segal, supra note 3 (arguing that uncertainty enhances deterrence).
73. William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming,
Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 631, 636–37 (1980–1981).
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For example, in the labor-law context, the uncertainty regarding the legal
status of an employee may deter him from suing to protect his legal rights ex
post. Furthermore, in the ex post situation, when the focus of both sides of an
employment relationship is on protecting their own legal rights, there is no
room, either behaviorally or normatively, for masking or decreasing legal
74
considerations. Thus, legal ambiguity may undermine the optimal functioning
of the law without giving rise to an alternative mode of decision-making.
An additional danger arises when one’s uncertainty regarding legal rights
may intensify the power gap among parties. For example, under the regime we
advocate, an employee in the context of labor law or a couple in the context of
75
spousal relationships may face uncertainty with regard to their legal rights. To
be sure, when the legal rights associated with the exit options of the individual
are uncertain, the power relations within the relationship become more
76
problematic. Those employees or couples may find themselves in an inferior
position as a result of the uncertainty in the law.
In sum, despite our general support of uncertainty, we believe that its
benefits should be balanced against its negative distributive-justice
consequences. Although we do not offer a complete solution to this situation,
the following part will demonstrate a possible balance between uncertainty and
its potential negative distributive-justice implications in various legal fields,
including labor law, tax law, family law, and health law.
V
POLICY IMPLICATIONS: THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY WITHIN THE LAW
A. Rules Versus Standards
In law and economics literature, much attention has been paid to the
77
difference between “standards” and “rules.” Standards and rules can be
depicted as two extremes in a one-dimensional space representing the degree of
specificity of legal norms. Both standards and rules are legal norms that
adjudicators use to direct actions. Standards are open-ended legal norms,
allowing the adjudicator to make fact-specific determinations, such as whether a
driver used “reasonable care” in a given situation. A rule, conversely, imposes
stricter limits on the discretion of the adjudicator.

74. There is an additional concern that should be taken into account regarding the influence of
cognitive biases like the disjunction effect on decision-making in large organizations. See Lauren B.
Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97
AM. J. SOC. 1531, 1568 (1992) (demonstrating that where the law is uncertain, large organizations tend
to create structural and cultural environments that discourage employees from exercising their rights).
75. For more details, see infra Part V.B.1 (discussing the certainty in cohabitation law).
76. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE
IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND STATES (1970) (discussing and comparing exit options of various
actors in various settings).
77. See generally Kaplow, supra note 2; Sunstein, supra note 1.
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The use of rules and standards involves different costs. In the view of law
and economics theorists, the choice between them should be determined by
78
these costs. The cost of producing standards is typically lower than rules, but
the former has higher enforcement and compliance costs. Promulgating the
standard “to take reasonable care in all matters” is extremely easy and does not
generate much cost. Applying this standard in practice, however, may generate
significant costs for judges, for example, who have to determine whether a
plaintiff or defendant complied with a standard, and for defendants, who have
to determine which level of precaution is necessary to escape liability. In the
case of specific legal norms (that is, rules), the relative size of costs is exactly the
opposite. The legislature incurs larger costs in creating a rule than in creating a
standard, as it has to specify more precisely the scope of the rule and the
consequences of its violation. On the other hand, rules are typically easier to
apply than standards. In addition, the costs of legal advice are lower, and it is
79
easier for citizens to predict their effects and act accordingly.
While the efficiency consideration is straightforward, the choice between using
standards and rules is difficult in the real world. The existing literature on the rule–
standard distinction identifies the choice between rules and standards as founded
on the frequency of the regulated activities. Rules are preferable when the
regulated activity is frequent, whereas standards do best when behavior varies so
greatly that any particular scenario is rare. Designing a rule for a rare scenario is
too costly and the use of standards is, therefore, preferred. Since rules are more
expensive to create, the costs are worthwhile only when the regulated activity
80
occurs frequently.
Recently, Feldman and Harel offered a behavioral case for use of legal
rules. Because the effect of social norms on compliance is far greater with
regard to standards than to rules, they suggest that the existence and the nature
of prevailing social norms should be taken into account when determining the
desirable degree of specificity in legal norms. Specifically, they argue that when
social norms of noncompliance serve individuals’ self-interest, legal rules are
81
preferable to legal standards as a tool to achieve compliance.
In this article, we use similar logic but approach it from the opposite
direction. When social norms align with the law, we prefer legal standards over
rules so that non-legal factors will be dominant in the decision-making process.
Naturally, giving judges greater flexibility in adjudicating the law is likely to
increase ex ante ambiguity, which is desirable in those situations. Furthermore,
with regard to the third type and according to our model, when uncertainty is

78. See Kaplow, supra note 2, at 619–20.
79. Of course there could be relevant non-economic considerations. The rule of law is often
considered a virtue of a legal system irrespective of its economic ramifications. Cf. Baker, Harel &
Kugler, supra note 35, at 472 (non-economic considerations are often provided to justify the use of
standards on the grounds that rules are too rigid and therefore unjust).
80. Kaplow, supra note 2, at 563.
81. Feldman & Harel, supra note 38, at 112.

FELDMAN & LIFSHITZ

Spring 2011]

3/6/2011

BEHIND THE VEIL OF LEGAL UNCERTAINTY

geared toward preventing crowding-out, using standards
additional justification. Standards may be the optimal solution
encouraging state policies of certain pro-social activities,
donations, without undermining the social capital which
activities.

161

may have an
when the aim is
such as organ
underlies such

B. Moral Hazard and the Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Distinction
In order to demonstrate the use of uncertainty in type-one scenarios, where
uncertainty may prevent moral hazards, we have chosen examples from family
law and bankruptcy law for discussion.
1. The Marriage–Cohabitation Distinction
For over two hundred years, civil marriage has been a recognized legal
institution in Western culture. During this period, it has been almost undisputed
that the law should distinguish between married spouses and unmarried
82
cohabitants, both in terms of their mutual duties (“the internal dimension”), as
well as in terms of their rights and privileges against the state and other entities
external to their relationships (“the external dimension”). In recent decades,
most Western legal systems have started to provide certain legal rights to
unmarried cohabitants. Yet in most legal systems, the legal preference for
83
married couples is still deeply rooted.
Traditionally, the preference for marriage has been based mainly on moral–
religious foundations. In recent years, however, a set of secular arguments have
84
developed to justify the promotion of marriage. At the heart of those
arguments is the understanding that marriage is a signal for high-level
85
commitment.
The first set of arguments focuses on the interests of the couple. In recent
years, research has demonstrated that from psychological and economic
perspectives, involvement in an intimate relationship with a long-term
commitment has significant value for the emotional and financial well-being of
the individual, for the individual’s self-image, and for the individual’s ability to

82. Maxine Eichner, Marriage and the Elephant: the Liberal Democratic State’s Regulation of
Intimate Relationships Between Adults, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 25, 26 (2007) (claiming that until
recently, the legitimacy of the state’s involvement in and support for marriage went largely
undisputed).
83. For a survey of the many tangible legal benefits of marriage, see generally David L. Chambers,
What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples,
95 MICH. L. REV. 447 (1996) and Michael S. Wald, Same-Sex Couple Marriage: A Family Policy
Perspective, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 291 (2001).
84. See Shahar Lifshitz, Spousal Rights and Spousal Duties: The Liberal Case for Privileging
Marriage, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF MARRIAGE AND OTHER INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 165, 165–
69 (Scott FitzGibbon et al. eds., 2010) (surveying the public arguments in favor of marriage).
85. Michal J. Trebilcock, Marriage as Signal, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
245, 249–50 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999); Russell D. Murphy, Jr., A Good Man Is Hard To Find: Marriage
as an Institution, 47 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG., 27, 27–28 (2002).
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function as a good citizen. Marriage constitutes a classic example of a social
87
institution embodying a profound and long-term intimate commitment.
Accordingly, there exists a public interest in supporting the social institution of
88
marriage.
Another type of argument focuses on the well-being of children. Extensive
research demonstrates the importance of a stable relationship for the physical
and mental well-being of children. This research has exposed the difficult reality
encountered by children and mothers who live in unconventional family
89
patterns—particularly in single-parent families but even in cohabiting
90
families —and the long-term ramifications of these difficulties. Since the wellbeing of children is an outstanding public interest, this interest also supports the
institution of marriage.
A third type of argument relates to the benefit to society that is inherent in
the institution of marriage. First, the financial responsibility imposed on the
couple within the framework of marriage frees the public from the need to
cover the costs of caring for weaker family members. In addition, theoretical
and empirical studies illustrate that marriage has a moderating effect on
91
individuals’ behavior and promotes positive social behavior in general.
Taking into account the public interest in promoting long-term commitment
between spouses, it seems reasonable that the law should distinguish between
marriage and cohabitation in order to encourage couples who are willing to
take on a long-term commitment to get married. Yet while the law should
distinguish marriage from cohabitation ex ante, various considerations justify
the award of certain marital benefits to cohabitants. The law has a role in the
protection of weaker parties within society—the responsive aspect of the law.
Consequently, even if it is deemed appropriate to encourage couples to marry,

86. For an overview of the psychological advantages of marriage, see Linda J. Waite & Maggie
Gallagher, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND
BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY 65–77 (2000). For an overview of the economic advantages of marriage, see
id. at 97–123.
87. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV.
1901, 1908–10 (2000).
88. For a similar argument, see Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 500–01 (1992).
89. See SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT 19–63
(1994).
90. See Wendy D. Manning & Daniel T. Lichter, Parental Cohabitation and Children’s Economic
Well-Being, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 998, 1009 (1996) (finding that children in cohabitating households
have an economic advantage over children in single-parent households but are at an economic
disadvantage compared to children in married households).
91. For an economic analysis of the moderating aspects of marriage and the social benefit thereof,
see William Bishop, Is He Married? Marriage as Information, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 245, 259 (1984)
(noting that marriage is a signal of desirable qualities, such as stability); David D. Haddock & Daniel
D. Polsby, Family as a Rational Classification, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 15, 33, 42–43 (1996) (noting that
members of traditional families generally regulate their behavior to uphold the household’s reputation;
noting that domestic partnership can be feigned for temporary social benefits and does not implicate
the same level of mutual responsibility).
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it may not be appropriate to leave unmarried couples or their children to their
own fate. Accordingly, this approach responds to the existing reality by
establishing legal principles that recognize the institution of cohabitation and
confer rights upon couples who have chosen that lifestyle.
Different legal systems have sought the proper balance between the
directive aspect of the law, which leads to distinguishing marriage and
cohabitation, and the responsive aspect, which supports granting marital rights
to cohabitants. The “veil of uncertainty” should have a positive role in this
context. Regarding marriage, the channeling–directive function of the law
should have a prominent role. The law should be clear and certain both in terms
of who is married and of which rights apply to marriage, in order to provide an
incentive for couples to get married. In the context of cohabitation, the directive
and responsive aspects of law must be balanced to provide a guiding principle
regarding which components of marital law should apply to cohabiting
92
couples.
The components of marital law in which the principal function is to
encourage participation in long-term relationships should not generally be
applied to cohabiting couples. In contrast, in the case of “responsive”
93
provisions, which focus on the protection of weaker family members (such as
various forms of bereavement pensions) and corrective justice (such as the
provision in torts law granting the partner of a person killed in an accident the
right to sue the tortfeasor), our argument for distinguishing marriage and
cohabitation is diminished. In such scenarios, the protective and responsive
functions of the law should receive greater weight. Yet, as we have already
explained, the responsive aspect of the law might harm its guiding aspect, as
wide imposition of marital laws on cohabitants may blur the distinction between
the institutions and decrease the incentive to get married. Here, legal
uncertainty and ambiguity may serve a positive role.
In contrast to the certainty that should characterize laws regarding marriage,
laws relevant to cohabitants should include broad legal standards that provide
courts with discretion to determine who should be considered a cohabitant
under the law and which marital rights should apply. In such a legal structure,
the ex post relief to cohabitants will not undermine the ex ante incentive for
couples to get married. In contrast to the conventional criticism on the current
ambiguity of laws for cohabitants, this ambiguity may actually benefit society.
Before concluding our discussion on the marriage–cohabitation distinction,
we would like to add three caveats. First, our analysis regarding the promotion
of long-term commitments is implicitly premised on couples that could choose
between marriage and cohabitation. In many Western countries, same-sex
couples are excluded from marriage. From a liberal perspective, it is implausible

92. See Lifshitz, supra note 10.
93. See Braschi v. Stahl Assoc. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53–54 (N.Y. 1989) (protecting housing rights of
cohabitants).
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to prevent them from getting married and to deny them marital rights.
Accordingly, we believe that the privileges derived from marriage as a tool to
encourage long-term commitment should also support the ability of same-sex
couples to undertake these same commitments, either by marriage or,
alternatively, by civil union that entails all the legal benefits of marriage.
Regarding families with children, the responsive aspect of the law,
particularly its protective function, should outweigh the directive aspect.
Accordingly, those components of family law in which the overt or covert intent
is to support children should be applied to all family models.
Finally, this part focuses on the external rights of cohabitants, as opposed to
their mutual duties (or internal rights). As we explain in the “limitation section”
94
of this article, in the context of the mutual relationship between couples,
absolute uncertainties regarding legal rights may intensify the power gap
between parties during the course of their relationship. In this context, we
believe that the law should provide a minimum level of certainty in order to put
the weaker party on notice that he or she will be entitled to legal remedies
95
should the couple separate.
2. Bankruptcy Law
In the context of bankruptcy law, the effect of uncertainty on the behavior
96
of legal actors has been recognized and criticized. Much of the discussion of
uncertainty has been with regard to the prioritization of different debts and
debtors. Uncertainty is seen as a factor which should be reduced, rather than as
a factor that may reduce the likelihood of an individual behaving strategically
ex ante when considering whether to take a loan. Indeed, moral hazard is a
major theme in a long list of laws where helping people deal with consequences
of certain behaviors may lead to situations where those behaviors could be the
97
product of manipulative intentions.
98
Legal ambiguity may curb the problem of moral hazard in bankruptcy law
by downplaying, ex ante, the exact reliefs defaulting debtors can receive. An
additional illustration of the potential role of uncertainty is related to the
increasing number of alternatives to the classic bankruptcy process. Much of the

94. See supra Part IV.
95. See Lifshitz, supra note 10, at 1601–02 (suggesting pluralistic regulation of spousal relationships
which objects to full equality of marriage and cohabitation but at the same time suggests imposing
selective components of marital law on cohabitants).
96. Baird and Bernstein have argued that uncertainty in the evaluation of the reorganized
corporation is part of the reason for the lack of coherency in absolute-priority criteria. See Douglas G.
Baird & Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain,
115 YALE L.J. 1930, 1935 (2006).
97. For a critical review and analytical discussion, see generally Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of
Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996).
98. The relationship between bankruptcy laws and morally hazardous behavior is relatively
straightforward and has been widely recognized in the literature. See, e.g., Joseph E. Stigliz, Bankruptcy
Laws: Basic Economic Principles, in RESOLUTION OF FINANCIAL DISTRESS (Stijn Claessens, Simeon
Djankov & Ashoka Mody eds., 2001) (discussing lending behaviors without due diligence).
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concern of academics who work within this literature is centered on the
strategic behavior by the various actors involved in creditor agreements.
Furthermore, the recent economic crisis has created many situations where
government bailout is an additional option for companies in dire
99
circumstances. When examining the pros and cons of who should be allowed to
take advantage of this option and under what circumstances, the problem of
moral hazard is mentioned as one of the main policy concerns, as executives
may evaluate their decisions based on the likelihood of getting legal relief
rather than on fixing the company. Keeping executives in the dark with regard
to types of legal relief available, as well as which parts of their debts could be
excused, could limit their focus on a law aimed at helping a company when no
100
other option is available.
C. Ensuring Genuine Choices
1. Employment Law
The area of employment relations is one of the typical legal contexts where
we see the dilemmas from the second type. As explained in part II, this type of
legal ambiguity focuses on ensuring that the law does not dominate one’s
decisions, even when the choice to do so is legitimate. Employers should not
engage in a behavior in which the main purpose is to pay employees less than
what the law requires, either by conferring a contractor title rather than that of
a full-fledged employee or by arguing that the individual in question should not
be seen as the company’s own employee. In various contexts, courts have been
very clear in their holdings against organizations structured purely to evade the
law.
We demonstrate the potential effect of ambiguity in this context with regard
to the core definition of the status of employees and employers as well as
intellectual property created in the workplace. In the context of employment
relations, the discussion can be divided into two basic questions: Who is an
employee, and who is an employer? The first question discusses the same
dilemma that we explored in our experimental sample—the distinction between
an employee and a contractor. In many cases, both employers and employees
prefer a situation where their relationship is flexible. The law permits service
providers to be defined as contractors or freelancers when this is an accurate
representation of their status. Judges and the legislature fear a situation in
which the main or only purpose is to create a fictitious representation of the
99. Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 16, at 469–70.
100. We are aware of the cost of legal ambiguity in this context. For example, ambiguity may cause
debtors to wait too long before asking for legal relief. The challenge of bankruptcy lawmakers,
therefore, is to find the equilibrium between morally hazardous risks and over-deterrence. A possible
option is to continue with the general broad standards ex ante but to add to the existing ambiguous
system a semi-individualized pre-ruling mechanism ex post that provides executives who run into
financial distress the ability to estimate the legal result of bankruptcy versus alternative debt
arrangements.
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employee as a contractor in order to evade the legal responsibilities employers
have toward their employees. In such a situation, due to the asymmetry
between employers and employees, such employees will not enjoy the benefits
contractors enjoy (for example, higher salary, flexibility, intellectual-property
rights) nor will contractors enjoy the benefits of employees (for example,
101
greater job security and equal protection rights). In this context, a common
criticism is related to the complex definition of the word “employee.”
In many legal systems, the definition of “employee” may change from one
statute to the next. In addition, courts have employed various tests to define
“employee” that take into account various factors that can sometimes be
determined only ex post (for example, the “true nature” of the relationship and
102
how parties perceive themselves). The complexity of those tests and factors
are often criticized.
Despite the problems associated with ambiguity in this context, there is at
least some value in the fact that employers facing ambiguity may be less
motivated by legal concerns in forming the relationships they maintain in the
workplace. Our simple experimental manipulation has shown this exact
phenomenon: Preference for employing an individual as a contractor was
reduced when legal status was ambiguous. The other primary way that
employers evade responsibility is with regard to their status as employers,
something which is especially problematic in “triangular” relationships, where
103
the user enterprise tries to escape its responsibilities as an employer.
In the context of who is an employee, one may point to the relatively
dominant involvement of courts in determining how the tests should be applied.
We see the reverse trend when the legislature has attempted to suggest clear ex
ante rules to determine when the user enterprise should be seen as the
104
employer.
In a recent example from Israeli law, there has been an attempt to replace
with legislation the discretion traditionally given to the courts regarding
employment status. Under the legislation, the user enterprise would act as the
employer after nine to fifteen months of tenure. Under this approach,
employers know in advance the length of time they can safely employ people
101. For a comparative discussion of many of the tests used by the United States, Canada, and the
United Kingdom, see generally Guy Davidov, Who Is a Worker?, 34 INDUS. L.J. 57 (2005).
102. Stephen F. Befort, Labor and Employment Law at the Millennium: A Historical Review and
Critical Assessment, 43 B.C. L. REV 351, 417–20 (2002).
103. See Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A Historical and
Comparative Perspective of Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 162–63 (2003).
104. For a discussion of this issue in Germany, see Anke Freckmann, Temporary Employment
Business in Germany, 15 INT’L CO. & COM. L. REV. 7, 8 (2004). Similar laws can be seen in France and
Belgium that have strict ex ante limitations both on the length of time and on the reasons that justify
using contractors. Furthermore, in these countries, there is an equal-pay requirement for contractors.
See generally Sabine Smith-Vidal, France, in TEMPORARY AGENCY WORK AND THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY 115 (Roger Blanpain & Ronnie Graham eds., 2004); Othmar Vanachter, Labour Law and the
Division of Power Between the Federal Level, the Communities and the Regions in Belgium, in
FEDERALISM AND LABOUR LAW 21 (Othmar Vanachter & Martin Vranken eds., 2004).
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105

without any fear of legal intervention.
In the context of contingent
employees—employees who are formally employed through one entity but
provide their services to a second entity—defining who is the employer is
especially important. This is primarily because many of the “formal employers”
are unable to take care of their employees’ basic needs. Legal ambiguity
regarding the permissible length of time of contingent work may make user
enterprises less likely to consider hiring people for fourteen months as a way to
evade the law.
We understand the limitations of our approach, especially when it comes to
relatively weak employees who lack ex ante knowledge. Without ex ante
knowledge of the law, for example, employees may wait too long before
claiming that an employer has engaged in fictitious transactions in defining
them as temporary employees. Therefore, the argument for the advantages of
ex ante legal ambiguity is stronger in situations where the decision to clarify
one’s legal status is not based solely on risk perception of weaker parties. In
situations where the weaker party is expected to act first, the cost of legal
ambiguity may exceed the benefit.
The second context we would like to discuss is the area of intellectual
property in the workplace. In this context, the role of ambiguity in preventing
strategic behavior by both employees and employers is complicated. Employees
are obligated not to divulge trade secrets and proprietary knowledge to entities
outside the corporation, and employers are obligated to respect the intellectual
property in employees’ inventions.
When deciding to what types of information the employee will be exposed,
there is an inherent conflict of interest between the employee and the employer.
With regard to the protection of confidential information, it is obvious that
employees want to learn information that could also be used when they leave
the company. In contrast, the employer’s main interest is that its employees
learn skills that will improve their productivity while they are working for the
company. The employer has no interest (and perhaps has a negative incentive)
in having employees learn information that could be used when they leave the
company. Given the increasing rate at which employees move between
companies in recent years, the effect of this conflict is substantial with regard to
106
the types of information to which employees will be exposed. A situation
where both employers and employees will not have a clear ex ante view of what
information is proprietary may ensure that employees have greater motivation
to learn as well as more opportunities to do so.

105. Indeed, very recently, the National Labor Court in Israel allowed a company to fire a
temporary worker after nine months even though there was no other reason behind the layoff. See File
No. 759-39-10 National Labor Court, Zohar Golan v. O.R.S (Dec. 9, 2010), Padaor (by subscription)
(Isr.).
106. See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing
Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 594 (2001).
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This argument needs a few adjustments and adaptations to stand up to
several possible criticisms. First, ex post when employees leave the company,
some clarification will be needed to avoid over-deterrence situations. Second,
even ex ante employees need clear rules as to which types of information may
be disclosed while they are working for the company. For example, employees
should be able to distinguish between topics they are free to discuss and those
that are off limits.
The argument regarding the distributive effects of ambiguity is
demonstrated nicely in the context of employment relations. The greater risk
aversion of employees, as well as their greater fear of ambiguity, may suggest
that without ex ante clarity, they may work in the company for more time than
is efficient for them simply because they are not certain of their ex post status.
Similarly, employers may have better tools for dealing with such ex ante
uncertainty, such as organizational measures that would replace the incentives
offered by the state. Employees would have limited ability to employ
countermeasures. Distributive concerns may arise when employees who are
unclear about the law refrain from discussing their rights when leaving the
company or looking for another job.
Yet these concerns are only partly valid. Our analysis distinguishes between
ex ante and ex post situations. The ex post status deals with a situation where an
employee (especially when it comes to sophisticated high-tech employees) is
planning to leave a company and seeks legal advice to sufficiently understand
the relevant law. In the ex ante status, the disjunction-effect prediction and our
own empirical demonstration suggest that both employers and employees are
less likely to focus on the legal status of the information employees are exposed
to during their tenure in the workplace. While recognizing the costs associated
with such ambiguity, we argue that the effort to draw a clear distinction
between proprietary and non-proprietary knowledge comes with a cost that also
needs to be recognized.
2. Tax Law and Tax Shelters
As already mentioned, tax law provides an additional illustration of the
107
potential role of uncertainty in law, under the second type. A prominent
example of this distorting effect is the tax shelter. Indeed, the term “tax shelter”
refers to transactions “carefully designed to fit within the letter” of various
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and Regulations to derive benefits
108
unintended by those sections.
Legal systems have fought against tax shelters through a combination of
dynamic legislation and ex post judicial intervention. Legislators attempt to stop
transactions that involve tax shelters by denying taxpayers the benefits that
made the transactions worthwhile in the first place. Yet, due to the complexity
107. See Weisbach, supra note 19.
108. Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Shelters and Statutory Interpretation: A Much Needed
Purposive Approach, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 697, 699 (2009).

FELDMAN & LIFSHITZ

Spring 2011]

3/6/2011

BEHIND THE VEIL OF LEGAL UNCERTAINTY

169

of tax systems, taxpayers enlist the services of the best consultants, and,
therefore, even the best legislators fail to block all such possible shelters. In
addition, statutory and regulatory amendments rarely operate retroactively in
the tax arena, with few, if any, exceptions. Thus, the benefits of successful tax
109
planning survive, even if the law is changed when the shelter is exposed.
Courts often use the “economic substance doctrine” as a tool to limit tax
110
shelters. The economic-substance doctrine usually contains a combination of
two inquiries. First, courts inquire objectively whether the transaction has a
reasonable prospect of a pretax profit—that is, whether the taxpayer could have
profited in the absence of the tax benefits gained—after taking into account
111
112
transaction costs. An additional test focuses on the taxpayer’s subjective
intention, namely, whether in entering the transaction the taxpayer was
113
motivated by a business purpose other than obtaining a tax benefit.
While legislation that covers undesirable tax shelters and the economicsubstance doctrine are important in the struggle against tax shelters, the veil of
uncertainty may serve as a complementary tool in this struggle.
As we have seen, the goal of the struggle against tax shelters is to prevent
taxpayers from engaging in legal actions with the sole purpose of avoiding taxes.
Therefore, concealing the tax consequences of a certain action may result in the
action being taken in accordance with pertinent economic considerations and
114
not out of a desire to fit any specific mold. The total concealment of tax
consequences is not feasible. However, as the behavioral part of this article has
shown, vague legal principles trigger the psychological process of disjunction,
leading people to base behavior on considerations other than vague legal
results. Accordingly, vague tax principles weaken the incentive to engage in tax
planning, and, instead, encourage a focus on the substantive planning of a
transaction. Furthermore, most tax planners and users of tax shelters are
affluent, and the struggle against tax shelters may also have a positive
distributive effect.115
At this juncture, we should add a significant caveat to the argument in favor
of vague rules in tax law. In the introduction, we suggested that laying a
smokescreen over the tax consequences of a certain action is worthwhile only to
109. Id. at 704–05.
110. See Davis P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW. 235, 237–40
(1999) (describing the types of challenges Commissioners may bring under the economic-substance
doctrine).
111. ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 231, 248 (3d Cir. 1998).
112. For the purpose of this article, it is unnecessary to figure out the exact relationships between
these two inquiries.
113. See, e.g., Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 441 (2006); Coltec Indus., Inc. v.
United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1355 (2006).
114. See, e.g., Jacob Nussim, Taxes, Prices, and Consumer Protection 3 (Bar Ilan Univ. Pub. Law,
Working Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1397643 (justifying the common practice in
the United States of listing prices excluding sales tax rather than listing prices with sales tax included, as
such a practice prevents the distorting effect of tax on behavior).
115. Weisbach, supra note 19, at 223.
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prevent a person from performing the action for tax purposes. In many
instances, however, tax laws are meant to encourage people to diverge from
their regular way of behaving, and to act in a certain manner encouraged by tax
legislators.116 In such cases, the concealment of the legal results of an action, or
even the creation of uncertainty regarding its results, undermines the goals of
tax legislators.
In the literature concerning the doctrine of artificiality, there was a recent
call to distinguish between situations in which the artificial transaction
undermines the legislator’s goal and instances in which the goal is realized. In
the former, the artificial nature of the transaction should be exposed. The latter,
in contrast, deals with cases where the legislator gives a tax benefit to investors
in certain locations who engage in certain activities or to taxpayers who employ
a certain type of person—both of which should not be invalidated solely
because they are intended to derive tax savings.117 In such cases, where tax law
aims to direct behavior, ambiguity is undesirable, as the rule is intended to be
formulated in a clear and concise manner. In instances where it is important to
encourage activity lacking a legal motivation, however, the veil of uncertainty is
beneficial.
D. Shielding Altruistic Motivation
The last type of analysis is pro-social motivation, where the use of
uncertainty is also desirable. We begin with a unique example from an Israeli
context and continue on to a discussion of surrogacy laws.
1. Incentivizing Reserve Duty
A classic policy debate in Israeli society is related to incentives for those
serving on reserve duty in the military. Although military service in Israel is
mandatory, many Israelis use various medical and personal excuses to evade
serving their reserve duty. In an attempt to provide incentives to more Israelis
to serve reserve duty, there have been various legislative changes to increase
the economic attractiveness of this service. In this context, the government faces
a tricky dilemma. On the one hand, given the need to increase the value of
incentives, there is a need to overplay their value. On the other hand, making
money too much of a factor may crowd out patriotism as an intrinsic
motivation, despite the risks faced by people who serve.
Here, we might have a different distributive effect than that described in
other types discussed previously. For lower-income people, monetary benefits
will be more valuable than to people from middle- and high-income families.
Therefore, informing people about the monetary incentives associated with

116. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax Incentives, 64
TEX. L. REV. 973, 975–76 (1986) (arguing that some tax incentives may be more efficient policy tools
than direct-expenditure programs).
117. See McCormack, supra note 108, at 722 (arguing that courts should examine the purposes of a
given law and “strip taxpayers of benefits that are discordant with those purposes”).
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reserve duty, may not only crowd out intrinsic motivation, but may also send
different signals to different segments of society. Thus, the use of uncertainty in
the type of rewards offered to soldiers may curb the negative effects of using
incentives ex ante while still making sure that a reimbursement ex post will
prevent people from feeling taken advantage of.
2. Surrogacy Contracts
An idiosyncratic use of vague principles is exemplified in the area of
surrogate-motherhood contracts. Such an arrangement is one in which a woman
agrees to bear a child for a commissioning couple. Surrogate-mother
arrangements, like the baby-making market in general, were supported at first
mainly by the outstanding proponents of the imposition of “commercial
market” norms on numerous realms of behavior.118 With time, however,
surrogate-motherhood agreements119 raised fears regarding the exploitation of
economically disadvantaged women and opposition to the commodification of
personal services.120 These objections were raised in the famous Baby M
decision, which expressed a position hostile to surrogacy contracts.121 The Baby
M decision was followed by several legislative acts that prohibited or greatly
restricted surrogate-motherhood contracts.122 Baby-making markets and
surrogate-motherhood contracts have been widely discussed in scholarly
literature as well. Scholars have made general commodification arguments
about the damage caused to the concept of paternity by the trading of fertility
and birthing services.123
Despite the fears of exploitation and commodification, there are distinct
advantages to surrogate-motherhood contracts that should not be ignored. First,
surrogate motherhood, like other modern procreation techniques conducted
within a contractual relationship (for example, egg donations), constitutes a

118. See Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV.
2305, 2330–34 (1995) (concluding that the analogy of surrogacy to baby-selling “only strengthens the
conclusion that surrogacy transactions should be legal”); Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner,
The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 324 (1978) (advocating a market in
babies).
119. See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Developing Markets in Baby-Making: In the Matter of Baby M, 30
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 67 (2007).
120. Radin, supra note 12, at 1930–33.
121. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1234 (N.J. 1988) (holding that a full surrogacy agreement is
unenforceable).
122. Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 109, 117–20 (Summer 2009). See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (1989) (prohibiting
surrogacy contracts), invalidated by Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-20-1-1 (West 2010) (prohibiting enforcement of most surrogacy agreements); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (2010) (declaring surrogacy contracts void); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
722.855–59 (West 2010) (declaring surrogacy contracts void and imposing criminal penalties on parties
to such contracts); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (2010) (declaring surrogacy contracts void).
123. See Radin, supra note 12, at 1931–32 (suggesting that surrogacy furthers the misconception that
a genetic connection between fathers and children is necessary to facilitate bonding); see also
Anderson, supra note 12 (discussing commodification in surrogacy arrangements generally).
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valuable contribution for childless women. As surrogacy is not a simple process
for the surrogate mother, few women would consent to volunteer to become a
surrogate without financial compensation. Instead of presenting the surrogate
mother as either one who has been exploited, or as a shrewd businesswoman, a
completely different narrative has developed, one that presents the surrogate
mother as an autonomous woman in control of her body who chooses to use it
to aid another woman. Consequently, a considerable number of contemporary
feminist writers emphasize the altruistic aspect of surrogacy, which also reflects
the solidarity between women.124 Beyond the theoretical discussions, an
approach sympathetic to surrogacy has also developed in court decisions in
recent years.125
In general, we share this sympathetic attitude toward surrogate-motherhood
contracts. Yet we maintain that a proper legal arrangement should also attempt
to take into account the traditional approach’s apprehensions regarding the
commodification of bearing children and the application of commercial contract
norms to surrogate-motherhood contracts.126
The example of surrogate-motherhood contracts illustrates the third type
discussed in this article—the “shielding of altruistic motivation.” This type
relates to instances where the law should encourage a certain type of altruistic
activity ex ante. Additionally, the law should recognize the ex post entitlement
of monetary compensation for the efforts and the risk that people have
undertaken. Yet legislatures may fear that the excessive prominence of
compensation may cast the action in an excessively commercial light in a way
that could harm the psychological and social quality of the action.
In the background of these competing interests, we propose a procedure for
surrogate-motherhood contracts that will, on one hand, encourage such
agreements and, on the other hand, contend with the issue of commodification
and the crowding-out effect. The law should allow surrogacy contracts and
clarify that such contracts are to be honored. Instead of setting forth an explicit
price tag in the contract itself in a manner that focuses on the commercial

124. See, e.g., Sanger, supra note 119, at 75–78 (describing the motivation of surrogate mothers as “a
complex blend of altruism and gain”); Scott, supra note 122 (analyzing the first wave of feminist
objection to surrogacy agreements).
125. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993) (en banc) (enforcing a gestationalsurrogacy agreement against the gestational-surrogate mother). Yet it is important to note that, unlike
the Baby M case that addresses full surrogacy, most of the modern cases have addressed gestational
surrogacy. For criticism on the distinction between gestational- and traditional-surrogacy contracts in
the existing law, see generally Noa Ben-Asher, The Curing Law: On the Evolution of Baby-Making
Markets, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1885 (2009). For a survey on the existing laws in various countries, see
Hugh V. McLachlan & J. Kim Swales, Commercial Surrogate Motherhood and the Alleged
Commodification of Children: A Defense of Legally Enforceable Contracts, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 91, 92–96 (Summer 2009).
126. Cf. Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong with a Parenthood Market? A New and Improved Theory
of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 58–59 (2003) (proposing an “antiessentialist” theory of
commodification of parental roles that accounts for “multiple meanings”).
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127

aspect, administrative bodies should, ex post, determine the proper payment
for surrogate motherhood, in accordance with the criteria set forth under the
law.
In this manner, legal support for surrogate-motherhood contracts will be
attained, while a veil of uncertainty will be drawn over their commercial–
economic aspects. In the spirit of the crowding-out literature and according to
our approach, someone interested in surrogacy solely due to the monetary
aspect will refrain from entering into such a contract because of the uncertainty
regarding the amount of the payment. In contrast, someone who is interested in
surrogacy because of the altruistic nature of the act, but who also has a desire
for monetary compensation, will not be deterred from participating in such an
act for lack of precise knowledge of the sum of the compensation.
Furthermore, the prohibition of surrogate-motherhood contracts containing
a price tag and the establishment of external agencies would limit the fears of
the exploitation of weak parties. In this sense, the establishment of a veil of
uncertainty in the realm of surrogate-motherhood contracts may have a
distributive effect supportive of economically weak parties.
As an aside, the arena of organ donations is also marked by the tension
between the fear of exploitation, commodification, and crowding-out effects
and the desire to encourage donations, acknowledging that some compensation
to the donor is fair and just. In most countries, these fears have led to a
prohibition of trading in organs. We believe that, in this context as well, it is
possible for administrative agencies to place a veil of uncertainty that would
determine ex post the compensation due to donors, while diminishing the fears
of exploitation, commodification, and crowding-out.
VI
CONCLUSION
For the most part, uncertainty and ambiguity have a bad reputation in legal
scholarship. This paper did not challenge that assertion, but rather
demonstrated the positive role that ambiguity may play in various legal
contexts. Our argument had two prongs: jurisprudential and behavioral.
The jurisprudential argument identified a typology of three contexts and
circumstances where creating a “veil of ignorance,” which masks people’s
awareness and knowledge of the ex post legal consequences of their acts, may
be desirable.
The behavioral argument suggested that a “veil of ignorance” in those three
types may be achieved through the use of ambiguity within the law. Our
behavioral and empirical analysis addressed the way people react to ambiguous
benefits. We argued that legal ambiguity may cause people to undermine their
127. Apparently, the function of completing the accurate reimbursement fees could have been
fulfilled by the courts. Nonetheless, we believe that administrative agencies have greater expertise and
are less likely than courts to antagonize the parties by creating unnecessary rivalry between them.
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consideration for the law altogether and refer to alternative motivational goals.
Therefore, our focus was not on how people make decisions under conditions of
uncertainty, but rather on how people may avoid taking legality into account
and choose alternative paths of behavior when the law cannot give them
certainty.
Following this theoretical discussion, we used an experimental survey
approach to measure one’s response to uncertainty within the law. This
hypothetical context explored the decision-making process of an employer who
had to decide whether to employ an individual as an employee or as a
contractor. Our findings suggested that under conditions of both uncertainty
and ambiguity, participants were less affected by benefits granted under the
law. In contrast, when participants were asked to evaluate the behavior of
others, uncertain benefits did have an effect on their evaluations. Furthermore,
we identified the existence of an interaction between the effect of uncertainty
and the strength of an individual’s preferences. Uncertainty was especially
relevant for individuals with low and intermediate levels of preference for
employees’ rights but not for those with strong preferences. Based on the
behavioral demonstration, we explored the distorting effect of the law and
suggested using a “veil of uncertainty” as a means to curb this distorting effect.
At the same time, we recognized that such a “veil of uncertainty” may
certainly undermine important functions of the law such as guiding one’s
behavior through the use of deterrence and incentives, expressing social values,
and influence on social institutions.
This article recognized some of the drawbacks may arise due to uncertainty
and hence illustrated several refinements and limitations regarding the use of a
“veil of uncertainty” mechanism in order to improve its potential benefits for
lawmakers. In the last part of the article, we demonstrated the potential rule of
the “veil of uncertainty” as well as its application to various areas of law (for
example, marriage law, bankruptcy law, employment law, tax law, and
surrogacy contracts). This last part demonstrated that, properly used,
uncertainty can dramatically enhance efficiency and fairness and prevent the
undesirable phenomena of excessive commodification of certain relationships,
as well as crowding-out.

